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Industrial relations changes in the Maldives: Critical events and actors 
Ali Najeeb, Villa College, Maldives 
Mary Barrett, School of Management, Operations and Marketing, University of 
Wollongong 
Abstract 
This paper analyses recent changes in the industrial relations (IR) system in the 
Maldives. Critical incidents were compiled from interview and document data and 
analysed using a quasi-grounded theory approach. The analysis shows that, 
precipitated by the political events of September 2003, profound democratic and IR 
changes took place, including the emergence of new IR actors and institutions. 
However, the outcomes of these profound changes were short-lived, reverting to old 
undemocratic practices and arrangements. The paper highlights the reasons why 
democratic change occurred as it did in the Maldives and why it reversed.  
  
Introduction 
The institutional perspective has shown how entities arise, acquire identities and interests, and 
become actors in institutional contexts (Wood et al., 2014). Nevertheless, some aspects of the 
institutional perspective and, within it, industrial relations (IR) are still developing. For example, 
although institutional research emphasizes how actors engage in institutional change, 
understanding of how those actors emerge is still developing (Hwang & Colyvas, 2011). Further, 
until recently IR research has largely focused on advanced industrialised nations rather than 
emerging economies (Kuruvilla and Erickson, 2002; Wood et al., 2014). Moreover, research 
typically links IR outcomes to countries’ economic policies rather than to their path of political 
development (Thelen, 2009). Addressing these gaps, this paper examines the link between 
political change and IR developments in the Maldives, considering the following questions: (1) 
what is the nature and cause of political and IR changes in the Maldives; (2) how did political 
and IR changes occur; and (3) why did the changes occur as they did? To answer these questions, 
this paper employs an historical institutional perspective to explore the role of actors in IR events 
(Thelen, 1999). 
The paper covers IR issues in a relatively under-researched context, the Maldives. The study 
makes three contributions. First, it systematically uses an historical institutional perspective and 
the literature  on the Maldivian political economy to show how institutional and IR change in the 
Maldives occurred, how new IR actors and institutions were established through political 
modernization, and how IR gains made as result of political changes backtracked with the 
reversal of democracy. It also provides a nuanced understanding of the fragility of democratic 
changes, and provides a more rigorous explanation of the extent to which they caused the 
February 2012 coup. Second, the study highlights the role of local and international actors at 
various stages of the Maldivian democratic journey. Third, by using a quasi-grounded theory 
approach to define and evaluate critical change incidents, the study provides a practical solution 
to the problem of defining a time-span in which significant institutional change can be seen to 
have taken place. 
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The paper is organized as follows. It first reviews the political and economic development of the 
Maldives and discusses the role of institutional analysis in IR research. Then, after outlining the 
study’s research method, it analyses political and IR change in the Maldives since 2003, showing 
how specific actors influenced and/or emerged from the changes. The final section discusses 
theoretical implications of the findings and suggests future research directions. 
  
The political and economic development of the Maldives 
The Republic of Maldives consists of about 1190 tiny, low-lying coral islands stretched across 
the equator in the Indian Ocean, with an entire territorial size of 859,000 square kilometres. Only 
192 islands are inhabited of which 101 have been developed as self-contained tourist resorts 
(MTAC, 2015). The population of 310,000 belong to a common race, Maldivian; embrace the 
same culture and religion, Islam; and speak a common language, Dhivehi (DNP, 2012).  
From the 1880s to the mid-1960s, the Maldives was governed by monarchies (Rasheed, 2014). 
The political state during this period was controlled by the monarchical rulers, their families and 
elites. The monarchical rule was characterised by the political desires and personal interests of 
the ruling class. The Maldives was a British protectorate until 1965. However, as the British 
engagement with the Maldives was intended to ensure political security for the Maldives rather 
than as a means to develop a mechanism of democratic governance, the Maldives did not inherit 
a political or legal system from the superior British institutional systems (Rasheed, 2014). As a 
result, the Maldivian legal system is a complex mixture of Shariah law and English civil and 
common law (MoFA, 2010).  
The Maldives became a republic in 1953 but the First Republic lasted only eight months before 
reverting to a Sultanate. The Second Republic was established in 1968. Until 2008, the President 
was elected by the Parliament and endorsed by the public in a referendum. Between 1968 and 
2008 Maldivians experienced two presidencies. As the Maldives was under monarchical rule, 
fundamental rights such as freedom of association and freedom of speech were suppressed under 
both presidencies (BHRC, 2012). In addition, income and wealth distribution gaps widened, 
nepotism and corruption were rife (Amnesty International, 2005; US Department of State, 2009), 
and there was no separation of powers. An embryonic opposition movement emerged in the 
1990s, but its voice and discussion of individual rights generally were silenced by government 
control of the media (Shaheed and Upton, 2008).  A personalised political system was created 
which acted as a barrier for the government to establish democratic governance during the 1990s 
(Rasheed, 2014). A democratization process began in the early 2000s, leading to the enactment 
of a new Constitution and the first multi-party election in 2008. Parliamentary and local council 
elections followed in 2009 and 2010 respectively (MoFA, 2010). 
Although free market principles inherited from the period when the Maldives was a British 
protectorate (Rasheed, 2014) and British trade dominated the region, trade and economic activity 
did not develop until the 1970s. The Bora merchants who dominated trade in the Maldives until 1960s 
also functioned in a weak institutional and business environment (Rasheed, 2014). As a result, 
formal employment is a recent phenomenon in the Maldives. Until the early 1960s, economic 
activity was paid in kind (HCRM, 2009), but this changed after two major tourist resorts were 
developed (Najeeb, 2013), which spawned other industries including fishing and construction. 
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However family members and associates of the president controlled these economically 
important sectors, exacerbating precarious forms of employment and the imbalance of wealth 
and power between capital and labour (ICNC, 2012). While the Maldives today is a democracy 
with an open, private sector-led economy, disparities in wealth and opportunity remain, 
especially between the capital and outlying islands. Despite rapid economic growth from 
tourism, job creation has not matched growth in the working age population (currently about 
200,000). In September 2011 there were close to 100,000 expatriate employees in the Maldives 
mostly in tourism and construction (Naish, 2012) and approximately 44,000 illegal workers 
(Latheef, 2011). Unemployment among Maldivians in 2012 was 28% (DNP, 2012).   
 
Institutional analysis in IR research 
Institutional analysis in IR has traditionally focused on formal regulatory institutions such as 
unions, laws and regulations (Jackson & Muellenborn, 2012). However, according to Wood and 
Lane (2012) and Morgan and Hauptmeier (2014), the institutional literature now recognizes that 
institutions are not as clearly coupled as often depicted, and that with national contexts it is likely 
that not one but several dominant work and employment relations paradigms are likely to be 
encountered. Wood et al. (2014) suggest that national institutional arrangements are constantly 
developing in a non-linear manner, and can never be made to assume the precise form or 
function as at the time of their original design. This reflects the choices of social actors who, in 
enacting and contesting specific frameworks, seek to bend structures to suit specific needs, and, 
in interpreting rules and procedures, invariably impart an element of  subjectivity (Wilkinson & 
Wood, 2012). The behaviour of these social actors is shaped by ‘institutional logics’, which 
provide the ‘formal and informal rules of action, interaction, and interpretation that guide and 
constrain decision makers’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999:904). In complex environments, 
competing or contradictory institutional logics co-exist, creating ambiguity and hence 
opportunities for actors to initiate change (Najeeb, 2013b). The change process may replace or 
combine earlier logics resulting in hybrid ideas (Rupidara and McGraw, 2010: 616). Thus 
institutional change concerns the erosion of an institutional logic which may change or 
ultimately even disappear (Oliver, 1992). 
Researchers following historical institutional analytical perspective place institutions and power 
relations at the centre of any analysis of change (Thelen, 2009). Historical institutionalism links 
the emergence of and changes in institutions and employment practices with wider developments 
in society and the nation-state. Institution building and consolidation result from formative 
events or crises with the result that ‘the longer the institutional arrangements remain in place, the 
more likely they are to be overturned’ (Wilkinson & Wood, 2012:378). An exogenous event is 
required for a radical change to be initiated (Wood & Lane, 2012).   
Bronstein (1995:163) argues that as all IR systems bear the marks of their origins, any change to 
individual, historical, political, legal, economic, ideological, social and cultural variables will 
change how IR are conducted. Accordingly, studies of IR change have focused on these 
variables. Kuruvilla and Erickson (2002:173) argue that “at any given moment some forces will 
be more urgent than others” and, in particular, that external constraints on national institutions 
such as pressure from transnational institutions predominate in driving actors to engage in 
institutional change.  
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IR scholars have also tried to analyse IR change in terms of whether it reflects evolutionary or 
discontinuous change (punctuated equilibrium) (Bronstein, 1995; Erickson and Kuruvilla, 1998; 
Wood et al., 2014). Evolutionary change is characterized by incremental changes which 
accumulate over a long period (North, 1990). Punctuated equilibrium, in contrast, consists of 
sharp shifts from one institutional arrangement to another (Streek, 2012). These patterns are 
revolutionary because a prolonged period of equilibrium or evolution is interrupted by a crisis 
that throws things into turmoil until a radical new set of institutional arrangements is established. 
There are three main components of the punctuated equilibrium view of change: deep structure, 
equilibrium periods, and revolutionary periods (Gersick, 1991). Transformational change to an 
IR system occurs when there are changes to the components of IR deep structure, that is, to 
definitions of property rights, the relative status of employees and employers, levels of 
individualism vs. collectivism, the nature of exchange in the labour market, and to the 
fundamental strategies of employers, unions, and governments. 
Historical institutionalism not only explains change but also explains persistence, stability, 
continuity and resilience. Institutional path dependency explains why institutions continue to 
operate in their own particular way (North, 1990). It recognizes that some institutions are deeply 
embedded, which makes any radical departure from established patterns of behaviour difficult. 
Stakeholders invest so much in operating within the boundaries created by their institutions that 
they do not want to follow any alternative pathway. For example, when institutions are 
inherently undemocratic, they create undemocratic paths for present and future politics (Bell, 
2011). As mentioned before, although such pre-existing weak institutional paths may change 
over time (Thelen, 2009), the nature of such changes depends on the political interactions within 
the existing institutional setting (Rasheed, 2014). This suggests that any traditionally transmitted 
undemocratic political practices embedded in the political system may weaken the government’s 
ability to establish progressive IR systems.  
 
Research approach: Data collection and analysis 
The research approach was primarily qualitative, using document searches and face-to-face 
interviews. Thirty people directly involved in the events and practices being analysed were 
chosen primarily through purposive and snowball sampling. The interviews used an open-ended 
format with interviewees being invited to describe their experiences of recent economic, legal 
and political changes in the Maldives. Interviews were conducted either in English or Dhivehi 
and lasted between 20 and 75 minutes. Table 1 below indicates the number of participants from 
specific groups, and the coding system by which the paper refers to each participant. 
Table 1 here. 
The data were analysed using a quasi-grounded approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008) to identify “critical incidents (CIs)”. In Flanagan’s original (1954) description, a 
CI is defined as any human activity sufficiently complete in itself to permit inferences and 
predictions about the person performing it. This approach, however, is less suited to the 
historical institutionalist paradigm used here, which seeks understanding of the long-term 
significance of events and institutions rather than individuals. As Campbell (2004) explains, a 
particular time-span of critical events can provide an appropriate timeframe for institutional 
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analysis, but significant events are difficult to define. An apparently critical event such as the 
passing of a new law may have little long-term effect whereas an apparently small event may 
have major consequences.  
We did two things to overcome this problem. First, relying on Boselie’s (2009:97) definition of a 
CI as “a definite and discrete occurrence that interrupts normal procedures or precipitates a 
crisis”, we used a semi-structured rather than an unstructured interview format. Second, 
interviewer knowledge based on the document analysis and previous interviews was introduced 
to prompt further reflection. The second adaptation was derived from the quasi-grounded theory 
approach used in the study. Documentary sources were first searched for key issues which 
appeared critical in Boselie’s (2009) sense, that is, which a substantial number of participants or 
documentary sources indicated had precipitated a crisis or, alternatively, marked the restitution 
of equilibrium. They were coded accordingly. Events coded as marking the onset of a crisis or 
the restitution of equilibrium yielded our timeframe: 2003-2009. These ‘crisis onset’ and ‘crisis 
ending’ events were grouped with events occurring between the two which, again, participants 
saw as producing a trajectory from crisis onset to crisis ending. This process generated a list of 
events that could be plausibly shown to encompass all (and only) truly critical incidents. There 
were 11 such critical incidents (see Table 2). 
Table 2 here. 
  
Findings  
The 11 CIs were tentatively grouped into similar thematic categories according to the issues they 
appeared  to embody. The categories were then tested by first comparing CIs as they were  
reported in the interviews and documentary sources, and then by comparing them with relevant 
literature (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). This process yielded nine thematic 
categories: the democratization process, democratization and labour rights, the development of 
dispute resolution mechanisms, employment legislation and regulation, constitutional changes, 
employee associations, employer associations, the role of government in IR, and international 
actors. In the remainder of this section, we outline interviewee perceptions of each theme as it 
emerged in the CIs and discuss it in terms of the literature on institutional and IR change.  
The democratization process: From stringent control to democratic concessions On 19 
September 2003 security guards tortured to death an inmate of the Maafushi Prison located in the 
capital of the Maldives, Male’. Despite government efforts to cover up the matter, the death 
became public knowledge through the inmate’s mother. When the news reached other inmates 
they rioted. Security guards opened fire on them, killing three and seriously wounding 17 others 
(BHRC, 2012). Although some condoned the security guards’ actions, people took to the streets 
and began demanding institutional accountability and democratic freedoms. According to a 
former Secretary-General of the HRCM, the severity of the event provided a focus for the 
domestic opposition and the international community, enabling them to work together: 
They [the opposition] suddenly found an event [which was] sort of drastic […] which was 
totally unexpected, which garnered support in both the domestic and the international arena. 
So it helped consolidate the efforts of the domestic opposition which was backed by the 
international community. (HR28)  
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Several opposition figures gave interviews to the international media exposing the government’s 
human rights violations before going into exile in Sri Lanka. There they established the 
Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) and sought international support.  Under pressure from 
within and abroad, in 2004 the government announced a “roadmap to reform” and convened the 
Constitutional Assembly to amend the Constitution (Maldives Partnership Forum, 2006). A 
presidential decree in 2005 gave political parties the right to operate in the Maldives (The 
President’s Office, 2007). The MDP, which had been operating in the UK and Sri Lanka, was the 
first to register. Four parties were registered by the end of 2005 (FIDH, 2012). Pressure from 
transnational groups resulted in the government undertaking a dialogue – “Westminster talks 
2006” – with the opposition. Eight political parties participated in the elections held in 2008. 
The reaction of the domestic community to the Maafushi Prison death supports Kristensen and 
Morgan’s (2012) argument that political upheavals allow individual actors to work collectively 
to reformulate interests and roles. The ensuing events which culminated in the 2008 elections 
suggest the initial event was sufficiently critical to alter institutional path trajectories (Thelen, 
2009). The establishment of the MDP is an example of “purposeful and continual actions of 
individuals and collective actors”, a condition crucial for institutional change (Reay et al., 
2006:993).  A sociological model of how actors pursue their goals suggests they “pursue 
legitimacy or taken-for-granted cognitive scripts” (Jackson & Muellenborn, 2012:475). The 
government’s “road-map to reform” comprised eight key elements including “promoting and 
strengthening human rights”, “enhancing the independence of the judiciary”, “a more 
independent media”, and “modernization of the electoral system.” These elements along with the 
Westminster talks in 2006, which will be discussed later, resonate with the scripts associated 
with a pursuit of democratic legitimacy. Overall, the events triggered by the September 2003 
death support the idea that institutions are political outcomes formed through conflicts and 
compromises between actors, and that if conditions change then actors seek to change 
institutions (Kristensen & Morgan, 2012). 
Democratization and labour rights – Employment issues flow from the political agenda 
Following the September 2003 events, employment issues emerged as a common theme in 
activists’ demands. For instance, following the president’s call for public debate on constitutional 
reform, reformists organized a series of forums (minivan bahus) to discuss political and human 
rights issues. Six forums were held before key leaders were jailed following demonstrations in 
August 2004 (Shafeeg, 2011). The HRCM also organized public forums in which a recurring 
demand was for an independent civil service. The demand arose from the fear on the part of 
politically active government employees that they would be dismissed. As a labour activist 
recalled: 
We wanted the assurance that we would not lose our jobs because we belonged to the 
opposition. In one of the forums, I even first asked the chair whether I could speak 
because I was a government employee. (LA22) 
Besides these forums, protests were organized by the MDP in association with various workers 
movements. For example, the MDP and port workers (majooreen) led the 2006 May Day rally. 
Employment issues were also prominent in these protests. The HR manager of a local resort 
recalled the scene as follows: 
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I saw people holding large banners with slogans such as ‘enact employment and 
pension laws’, ‘join the ILO’, ‘allow unions’, ‘set minimum wage’,  ‘follow 
international labour standards’, ‘abolish discrimination’, ‘equal pay for work of equal 
value’ and so on. (RM16) 
The media, which had become relatively free as a by-product of political change, played a key 
role in advocating employment rights. The opposition movement started a radio station 
[Minivan radio] which broadcast from the UK. At the same time, the local print media began 
focusing on employment rights issues. As another labour activist commented: 
We started seeing articles in newspapers about labour issues for the first time in 2004-
2005. We saw bold headings such as ‘labour rights must be protected by law’. It was 
unprecedented. We hadn’t seen such a thing before, despite the print media such as 
Haveeru Daily being there since 1979. (LA23) 
Through forums, protests, and news media, employees became aware of previously obscure 
entitlements. For instance, employees became aware that under the blue (1997) Constitution they 
were entitled to a pension. As a MTAC official noted: 
The right to have the pension was even guaranteed in our ‘blue Constitution’. But 
nobody spoke of this before. The opposition blamed the government for not taking 
action to provide a constitutional right and started to speak about this. (GO25) 
In a similar way, employers and employees became aware of a 1994 employment regulation 
governing employment relations in the private and public sectors, and they started enquiring 
about it. As a former director of the Labour Relations Authority (LRA) explained: 
I was at that time working in the legal department of the employment ministry and we 
received calls from people – both managers and ordinary employees – enquiring about 
the labour regulation. They requested to put it up on the website, asked whether the 
ministry could provide an English version of it and so on. (GO24) 
Increased awareness of employment rights led to employees pushing for them both collectively 
through petitions and strikes, and individually. An example of individual action was a case filed 
by a government employee who had been dismissed for political reasons. Although such 
dismissals had been common, no-one had previously challenged them administratively or legally. 
The judgement favoured the employee. A former director of LRA commented about the 
government’s reaction to this landmark decision: 
The government took the matter very seriously and responded swiftly. They wanted to 
challenge the decision in the High Court. We advised not to do so. But the government 
still tried to figure out how to avoid such a decision in the future. (GO24) 
Bronstein (1995) and Anner (2008), examining IR changes in Latin America between the late 
1970s and the mid-1990s, found that the democratization process with its increased freedom of 
assembly and expression brought hope that employment rights would eventually be granted. 
Rupidara and McGraw (2010) made a similar finding for Indonesia. These events in the 
Maldives illustrate how, as in these countries, political dynamics prompted IR developments, and 
changes to institutional mechanisms encouraged actors to alter institutions (Barley and Tolbert, 
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1997). They also indicate the media’s role in disseminating and legitimating ideas (Braam et al., 
2007) and increasing pressure on institutions (Daniels et al., 2002). 
Employment dispute resolution mechanisms - from handmaidens of government to guardians 
of employment rights As in Latin America, strikes in the Maldives began with political change. 
The first strike was organized by employees in an international five-star resort (Robinson, 2010). 
Workers demanded improvements in working conditions and an end to long-standing 
employment practices favouring expatriates over local workers. Many strikes by resort workers in 
the period 2005-2008 ended with key employees being sacked (HRCM, 2009). Nevertheless, 
improvements in line with workers’ demands often followed later. As a resort worker said: 
We went on strike because we wanted things to be improved for us and to eliminate all 
sorts of discrimination. We demanded better food and better facilities. The 
management didn’t agree with us. But later on, a local chef was employed and we were 
given gym facilities. (RW10) 
Seeking legitimacy in the eyes of potential foreign investors (Jackson & Muellenborn, 2012), the 
government responded quickly and severely to put down the strikes. The introduction of 
Employment Dispute Resolution Regulation (2011) further limited the constitutional right to 
strike by imposing numerous conditions on its legality. Similarly, the Employment Tribunal’s 
function was ostensibly to resolve employment disputes, but the Act which established it did not 
mention stoppages or strikes. Similarly, the 2013 Peaceful Assembly Act restricted 
demonstrations to locations designated by the government, so that it served as a means of 
political control rather than to enable peaceful assembly (Najeeb, 2014). These actions show how 
a powerful actor such as the state can establish and support parallel logics in the regulatory 
environment 
Nevertheless, such conflicting institutional frameworks create loopholes which actors can exploit 
later and this happened in the Maldives. For example, in response to domestic and international 
pressure over the events of September 2003, the first human rights commission was established 
in 2003 by presidential decree (Shafeeg, 2011). However, as its members were handpicked by 
the president, political and human rights activists pushed for an independent body. As a labour 
activist noted:   
We demanded individual rights to be recognized as equally with state’s rights and called 
for an independent human rights oversight body. (LA22) 
In response in 2006 the government passed the Human Rights Act and established an 
independent Human Rights Commission (US Department of State, 2009). A former Secretary-
General of the commission recalled his involvement in some of the HRC’s activities as follows: 
We conducted a number of rapid assessments and investigations into the abuse of 
workers and also visited places where migrants were working. We observed a number of 
abhorrent things […]. We had a number of meetings with the LRA and published reports 
and made direct recommendations to these state agencies. (HR28) 
Despite the formation of the Employment Tribunal and the LRA, employment-related cases still 
comprise the vast majority of cases dealt with by the HRCM, with 99 employment related 
complaints dealt with in 2014 (HRCM, 2015). This finding supports the finding by Heery and 
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Frege (2006) that actors who perform IR functions in the absence of traditional IR actors often 
continue in this role even after more prominent IR actors and systems are established. 
Employment legislation and regulations – from fragmentation to protective unity Since the 
1960s, the government had used various procedural regulations to administer the employment of 
government employees (HRCM, 2009). These fragmented regulations were consolidated into a 
single regulation only in 1994. The new regulation, which extended to both private and public 
sector employees, covered minimum standards in employment agreements, hiring and firing, 
promotion, compensation and benefits, working hours, and leave entitlements (The President’s 
Office, 2007) However it lacked critical provisions on discrimination and unfair dismissal 
(HRCM, 2009). Moreover, few stakeholders were aware of its existence as information about it 
was not available in the public domain and not disseminated to private sector 
stakeholders. Accordingly, as a resort manager (RM19) pointed out, “… this regulation was not 
implemented in the private sector.” 
An independent civil service was established via the Civil Service Act (2007) as part of the 
president’s “road map to reform”. It comprehensively covers the governance of civil service 
employment. In May 2008, as the democratization movement began, the Maldivian Parliament 
passed the Employment Act 2008, the first general law governing employment relations. Its 
objectives were: (1) to protect vulnerable workers’ employment rights; (2) to regulate and 
improve the welfare of both local and expatriate workers; and (3) to pave the way for the 
Maldives to join the ILO and ratify its core conventions (Employment Act, 2008). It imposed 
severe penalties for violations of its provisions on forced labour, unfair workplace 
discrimination, and the employment of minors. It also regulated a range of individual 
employment matters, the employment of foreign workers, and employment agency 
activities.  Finally, it provided for the establishment of an Employment Tribunal to adjudicate 
employment disputes. The Tribunal became fully functional in April 2009. The Act also 
authorized the LRA to improve the law’s application by identifying legal loopholes. As the 
legislation applies to all employment sectors except the security forces, it has become the main 
avenue for introducing IR changes. Thus Maldivian employment law exemplifies “changes 
which reinforce or establish protections for workers by stipulating these in legislation” (Cook, 
1998:317) 
Constitutional changes – solidifying the legal basis of employment rights The Maldives 
ushered in a new liberal Constitution (‘fehi qaanoon asaasee’ – the Green Constitution) on 
7 August2008 when Parliament amended the 1997 Constitution (‘noo qaanoonu assaasee’ – the 
Blue Constitution1). The new Constitution ensured the separation of the executive, legislative, 
and judicial branches of the state and established new independent institutions and laws. It also 
extended some existing rights, reflecting the trend towards democratization, and strengthened 
independent bodies such as the HRCM and the CSC (FIDH, 2012). The 2008 Constitution 
granted a range of employment rights including the right to work, to organize trade unions, to 
strike, and the right of pension, and prohibited forced labour and all forms of unfair 
discrimination. As an HR manager of a resort noted: Constitutional rights have changed our way 
of life (RM17). Following the enactment of the new Constitution, the Parliament passed the 
Pension Act, which required all public and private employers and employees to participate in the 
                                                          
1 The names of the constitutions were informally referred to by the colour of their covers, hence the ‘Blue 
Constitution’ and the ‘Green Constitution’.   
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Maldives Retirement Pension Scheme with a minimum monthly contribution of 7% of the 
pensionable wage. These constitutional rights prompted further positive developments in 
Maldivian IR context. Accordingly they support Fry’s (2008) argument, based on his 
observations of Laos, that constitutional reforms strengthen labour rights. 
Employee associations – from independent movements to quasi political parties Under the 
Association Act clubs and associations in the Maldives must be registered with the Registrar of 
Associations at the Ministry of Home Affairs. More than 700 associations and NGOs were 
registered between 2003 and 2008 (Raajje Foundation, 2009). However, before 2005, the 
government did not allow opposition associations to register (Shafeeg, 2011).  Until 2005, when 
the Teachers Association of Maldives (TAM) and the Maldivian Medical Association (MMA) 
were allowed to register, the Law Society of Maldives was the only employee association 
formally in existence. The TAM and the MMA represented the interests of many government 
employees and, once they were registered, they energetically lobbied for salary increases for 
their employees until the Maldives Civil Servants Association (MCSA) was formed in 2009 
following the establishment of an independent civil service. 
The Tourism Employee Association of the Maldives (TEAM) is the most active employee 
association. It was formed in 2008 by resort workers seeking protection of their employment 
rights because they had been excluded from Chapter 4 of the Employment Act when it was 
initially enacted. Najeeb (2014) attributes this exclusion to the fact that many members of 
parliament were also resort owners. A TEAM executive recalled the association’s beginnings as 
follows: 
We collected 10,000 signatures from resort workers and submitted a petition to both the 
government and the parliament giving them an ultimatum to amend the law. We told 
them if they do not meet our demands, we would bring the industry to a standstill. 
(TM29) 
Since its formation, the TEAM has continued to build its membership and act for workers in 
workplaces and the courts. Minivan News (2010) quoted TEAM’s president: 
We have 100 cases ongoing in courts ranging from the labour tribunal to the Supreme 
Court. I am spending $2000 a month on the TEAM and working 20 hours a day, 
because resort workers are not paid enough to save up for things like lawyers. 
Despite their achievements and their potential to emerge as unions, employee associations risk 
becoming trapped in party politics. While acknowledging the importance of political 
independence, employee associations also believe political affiliation is necessary to provide a 
voice for employees. As a TEAM executive noted: 
Resorts are conforming to the Employment Act not because they really want to, but 
because they fear that our man [the president of TEAM – an MP] in the parliament 
might play the name and shame game if they don’t follow the law. (TM30) 
The interactions among the TEAM, the government and members of parliament reflect the 
choices of actors who ‘seek to bend structures to suit specific needs’ (Wilkinson and Wood, 
2012:378). As Bhattacherjee and Ackers (2010) observe about India, one reason politicians link 
themselves with employee associations is that they can access large numbers of supporters who 
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need skilled representation of their interests. The establishment of the TEAM also exemplifies 
how the political environment interacts with institutional arrangements such as the constitution 
and ensuing employment legislation to facilitate the rise of labour movements (Tilly, 1995). It 
also shows how new IR actors emerge in the absence of traditional actors such as trade unions 
(Michelson et al., 2009).  
Employer associations – continuing to serve the elite In the 1980s when the Maldives 
Association for the Tourism Industry (MATI) was established, it was the only official employer 
association. Formed by close associates of the regime who controlled tourism, the MATI helped 
shape government policy on tourism. Later, during the democratization process, other employer 
associations such the Maldives Association for the Construction Industry (MACI) emerged. 
Consistent with Cooke’s (2011) findings for PRC, employer associations in the Maldives put 
pressure on the government if legislation promised to have a negative impact on their businesses. 
For example, they successfully lobbied to prevent expatriate employees from enrolling in 
employee retirement schemes and for more favourable goods and services tax legislation. 
However employer associations do not engage in collective bargaining and most still do not have 
a significant role in developing policies for their member organisations.  
Economic and labour market policy change - towards ‘Aneh Dhivehi Raaje’ (A different 
Maldives) A new MDP-led government came to power in the multi-party elections in November 
2008, ending Maumoon Abdul Qayyoom’s 30-year dictatorship. The MDP had campaigned with 
an ambitious manifesto: ‘Aneh Dhivehi Raaje’ (A different Maldives).  The MDP’s first task in 
government was to stabilise the economy by increasing taxes and cutting the public service. 
Since then it has generally pursued a centre-right economic policy of privatization, public service 
cuts, and seeking foreign investment (The President’s Office, 2009). This agenda has been costly 
for employees and has further polarized Maldivian society (Nazeer, 2010). 
The Maldivian government has included a labour ministry since the 1990s. At first, its function 
was to issue expatriate work permits, deal with unpaid wages and foreign worker repatriation 
(Najeeb, 2014). Under the MDP government, responsibility for labour administration, labour 
inspection, formulating employment policies, and employment promotion was vested in the 
Ministry for Youth and Sport (MHRYS). While the LRA performs labour administration and 
inspection functions, the MHRYS has improved training levels through university and vocational 
education scholarships (Shifleen, 2011). Education and training have also been extended with the 
establishment of the Maldives National University and the Maldives Polytechnic. MHRYS job 
centres helped match employees with employers in a tight labour market (Maldives Resort 
Workers, 2009). The government also introduced a social welfare system to protect vulnerable 
workers. 
The IR policy changes discussed in this section show how substantial political shifts are reflected 
in how the economy in general and IR systems in particular function in a particular society 
(Thelen, 2009). It also supports the findings of Kuruvilla and Venkataratnam (1996) that in 
economically successful Asian countries, industrial relations policies and institutions are closely 
tied to economic development strategies. In particular, adopting IR policies to enhance 
workplace flexibility and skills enhancement is consistent with moves towards democratization. 
In the Maldives, however, some progressive MDP policies in education and welfare have been 
accompanied by some degree of labour repression. 
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International actors – keeping the government under close scrutiny Maldivian IR systems have 
been influenced by changes in the social and political environment and by ideas transferred 
across national and institutional boundaries. For instance, the ILO’s technical assistance was 
sought to draft employment legislation. The 2008 government expedited the Maldives’ 
admission to the ILO, which was completed in May 2009. The Parliament approved ILO core 
conventions and the government ratified them in January 2012 (MoFA, 2013), but they are yet to 
be translated into the Maldivian regulatory environment. A former director of the LRA described 
the ILO’s engagement with the Maldives this way: 
The ILO started visiting the Maldives and reviewing institutional and legal provisions 
and advising the government on how to accede to conventions. That helped develop the 
government’s general awareness of their obligations in terms of establishing strong 
industrial relations. (GO24) 
Other international actors contributed to political change in the Maldives. For instance, Amnesty 
International published reports on the repressive nature of the Maldivian regime. The UK-based 
Friends of Maldives developed the pro-democracy movement’s independent media capacity and 
exposed human rights violations. The Commonwealth and the UN provided legal 
and Shariah experts to help draft the new Constitution (Shafeeg, 2011). The UK High 
Commissioner to the Maldives organized educational forums about democracy and held 
Westminster talks in Sri Lanka to expedite constitutional reforms (Maldives PartnershipForum, 
2006). The UK Conservative Party provided technical support to the MDP to develop its 
institutional capacity. 
New institutions and practices emerged from these interventions, reflecting internationally 
recognized structures and practices. For instance, the MDP was established on a centre-right 
platform and the Employment Tribunal was formed as a quasi-judicial and quasi-administrative 
body. A high degree of pressure is also apparent in the way some international organizations and 
foreign governments sought to persuade the Maldivian government to comply with international 
human rights and democratic standards. For instance, after the August 2004 crackdown on 
opposition protesters, the government declared a state of emergency. The European Union 
responded by demanding the Maldives government implement democratic reforms or face a 
variety of boycotts (Shafeeg, 2011). 
The nature and causes of the ‘coup d’état’ Although the changes described above appear 
revolutionary, recent events show the difficulty of sustaining truly radical shifts and these 
changes have not become fully institutionalized (Rupidara & McGraw, 2010). On 7 February 
2012 after three years in power, the MDP government was ousted by what the party described as 
a ‘coup d’état’ (Robinson, 2012) executed by some mutinous law enforcement agencies and 
political parties. A number of factors could underlie the overthrow of the MDP government and 
the failure to sustain the political, institutional and IR establishment. First, although 80 percent of 
coups in the world between 1950 and 2008 took place in countries where autocratic regimes 
were replaced with more democratic ones, this was not the case in the Maldives with the 
February 2012 coup (Lutfi, 2015). The Maldivian coup replaced the first democratically elected 
government with key figures who served the previous dictatorial regime which had governed the 
country for the 30 years prior to 2008. Hence, this coup was undertaken not in the best interests 
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of Maldivians but to pursue the vested interests of certain elite groups. Governing Maldivians is 
perceived to be easy and being in the government is seen as a lucrative business (Lutfi, 2015).    
Second, historical and founding conditions embedded in political institutions weakened the 
political and IR arrangements (Bell, 2011; Lutfi, 2015). Godard (2009) argues that historical 
conditions and traditions become embedded in institutional norms that shape national 
institutional environments and trajectories. In the case of the Maldives, traditionally there had 
been competition between various political elites for political and vested interests. This 
behaviour had been embedded in the political culture of the Maldives for over 800 years. With 
the help of a group of political players several governments have been overthrown using havaru 
–  a militant group of people from six main regions of the capital (Lutfi, 2015; Rasheed, 2014).  
Third, despite the MDP government’s best efforts to change the mechanisms of government, 
traditionally weak informal rules, institutions and undemocratic practices created and shaped by 
previous monarchical rule were transmitted over time to become embedded in the political 
system. This reduced the MDP government’s capacity to manage socio-political and economic 
activities in the most democratic manner (Rasheed, 2014). The weak political system did not 
support efficient interactions between the government and society. There was an apparent lack of 
adaptive efficiency in maintaining democracy. For instance, sometimes the government failed to 
govern socio-political activities according to legislative and constitutional provisions (Rasheed, 
2014).  
Fourth, when the MDP government assumed office the local and global economies were in bad 
shape. Consequently it took austerity measures which did not go down well with the public. 
Moreover, the government introduced privatization through a private-public-partnership program 
(PPPP), and introduced a progressive tax system and a welfare system which hurt the ego of 
business elites who mobilized their resources against the MDP government (Lutfi, 2015).  
Fifth, the 2008 elections only changed the executive of the state. All other machineries of the 
state, including the newly formed judiciary, legislature, security forces and independent 
institutions remained under the control of the former dictator. Consequently, most of the state 
machinery worked against the government. As President Nasheed stated: “it is easy to change a 
dictatorship but it is hard to get rid of the reminiscence of dictatorship” (Nasheed, 2013).  
Finally, the pace of change was so fast it could not allow for careful planning of the execution of 
the projects and programs. On the one hand,  the fast pace of change appears positive as the 
delivery of pledges started to emerge; on the other hand, the fast pace of change compromised 
some democratic values and principles such as rigorous public consultation, transparency, and 
following due process (Lutfi, 2015).  
According to the historical institutional perspective, certain actors may become more powerful 
than others at specific times, leading to a systemic crisis (Wood et al., 2014). In the case of the 
Maldives, when the MDP was in power, various opposition forces at play were more powerful 
than the government. The media was largely controlled by these forces and religious groups used 
nationalistic and religious rhetoric against the government. These forces played a critical role in 
bringing about the February 2012 coup. Some civil society organisations and employee 
associations which strove to bring about democracy along with the MDP withdrew their support 
and joined the opposition forces as their interests were not being served by the government’s 
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policies. Although the MDP government tried to compromise with the opposition forces that 
dominated the political and social arena to make compromises, its attempts were unsuccessful as 
opposition forces were committed to overthrowing the government (Streek, 2012).   
Beyond the ‘coup d’état’- reversal of democracy and IR gains Wood and Lane (2012) argue 
that if the change process is only partially destructive, there is a possibility that past institutional 
arrangements will be reconstructed with result that might differ from the preceding regime. This 
effect is apparent in the case of the aftermath of the coup. The trend has been towards a complete 
reversal of political and IR gains made during the MDP government. Since the change of the 
government in 2012, constitutional rights have been threatened and some positive developments 
in civil and employment rights have been reversed (Rodgers, 2014). The right to elect a 
government of choice has been undermined by the alleged undue influence of the Supreme Court 
and security forces. One result is that the half-brother of the former dictator won the 2013 
general and subsequent parliamentary elections. Restrictions in freedom of speech have led the 
country to fall from 52nd position in the 2010 Press Freedom Index to108 in 2014 (Reporters 
without Borders, 2014). As the government is in control of the legislature and judiciary, 
democratic institutions have become dysfunctional. The rules of the constitution lack check and 
balance mechanisms (Rasheed, 2014). Hence, in the absence of functioning democratic 
institutions, the current government is manipulating legislation and is imposing hierarchical 
authority over political and economic activities to achieve self-interested goals. For example, 
several opposition leaders were recently jailed on terrorism charges.  
The reversal of democracy has been having a significant impact on IR. For example, in January 
2013, the government ratified the Peaceful Assembly Act which prohibits all forms of protest or 
assembly in a tourist resort. Cases of dismissal of private and public sector employees for 
political activism have also been reported (Naaif, 2013; Zaheena, 2012). For instance, more than 
10 employees of a public limited company were fired for attending 2015 May Day rally 
organised by opposition parties (Zaheena, 2015). Public sector employees have been forced to 
attend the ruling party’s political functions. The independence of the Civil Service has also been 
threatened as employees have been dismissed as a result of undue influence from politicians. 
Hence, the job security of public sector employees is at all-time low.  
The current government’s commitment to IR developments is also in question as although the 
ILO core convention has been ratified, the relevant legal framework has not been established. 
Similarly, TEAM executives reported that despite their demands, the government is playing 
delaying tactics to avoid sending the ILO drafted IR bill to the government controlled 
parliament. Similarly, rather than adopting a holistic approach to initiate employment law 
reform, the government is arbitrarily amending the law to serve its political interests.  
Due to the erosion of democratic rights, there has been a replication of events similar to those 
that took place in 2003-2012 to establish democracy. The role of local and international actors 
has been crucial in this endeavour. While ILO is continuing its engagement with the Maldivian 
government to develop IR systems, other international actors such as Amnesty International and 
the European Union have been putting pressure in a similar manner as they did previously to 
improve the human rights situation. Most friendly nations have also been engaging with the 
Maldivian government to make positive gains, although the government continues to influence 
them through  geopolitical games (Wood et al., 2014). The government has also been countering 
these pressures by hiring international PR firms such as Omnia Strategy (Minivan News, 2015). 
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Although international actors are making impactful gains in this process, local civil society 
seems to be lagging behind in the effort to restore democracy. Most NGOs disintegrated when 
the government that had backed them disintegrated and they have yet to reorganise and become 
active to create effective change.   
 
Discussion, implications and future research 
This paper presents an historical institutional evaluation of political and IR developments in the 
Maldives between 2003 and 2015. It highlights the ways in which a particular set of institutional 
arrangements may be destabilized and replaced by new arrangements through the process of 
political conflicts (Godard, 2009). The analysis reveals that economic development and 
increased formal employment from the early 1970s to the early 2000s were not linked to more 
progressive employment relations. However, consistent with North (1990), the prolonged 
stability of the previous institutional arrangements was interrupted by a major political crisis in 
September 2003, leading to new institutional arrangements. This supports Thelen’s (1999:36) 
argument that “change in one institutional arena can reverberate, provoking changes in other 
complementary institutions”. It is also consistent with research into IR developments in Latin 
America (Anner, 2008; Bronstein, 1995) linking IR change to democratization. 
The political changes brought new political, legal and IR institutions and actors into Maldivian 
systems, including political parties, NGOs, independent institutions, employee associations, a 
new Constitution, and new employment laws and regulations. The government’s labour and 
education and training policies improved and new IR actors such as job centres emerged. As 
Rupidara and McGraw (2010) observed about Indonesia, the ideas for the new institutions were 
in part sourced from outside-in, providing alternative logics to the existing institutional 
arrangements in the Maldives. As evidenced by the increased number of employee strikes, the 
establishment of new IR institutions also changed the balance of power in the workplace. 
Democratic changes in the Maldives took place as a result of an open struggle over the very core 
of the institutional status quo – the system of governance. Local and international actors and the 
media all created awareness about rights, pressured the government to make political and IR 
changes, and facilitated the development of new institutions and laws, reflecting strong 
normative influence(Scott, 2008). New employment actors such as political parties, NGOs, 
employee associations, and agencies such as the HRCM represented employees in the absence of 
traditional employment actors such as trade unions and sometimes continued their IR role after 
trade unions were established. 
The changes that took place between 2008 and 2012, such as freedom of expression and 
association, the employment rights granted by the Constitution and accompanying legislation, 
and the establishment of institutions such as the LRA and a quasi-administrative and quasi-
judicial employment tribunal, democratic reform and the 2008 Constitution suggest a complete 
break with the past. Nevertheless some of the democratic changes have not been fully 
institutionalized. In February 2012 the first democratically elected government of the Maldives 
was allegedly ousted by a coup. Since then, there has been a reversal of civil and political rights. 
It is significant that it has been so easy for the post-coup government to revert to the policies and 
practices of the past. The study identified a number of reasons for the ousting of the progressive 
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government and the reversal of democratic and employment rights. The main reason is that the 
weak institutions, undemocratic rules, and monarchical practices embedded in the political 
system have persisted in the current political system constraining the government’s capacity to 
act in the most democratic and efficient manner (Godard, 2012; Rasheed, 2014). In short, the 
pre-existing undemocratic rules in the Maldives inhibit the democratic reforms observed in 
Western societies (Bell, 2015).  
A number of insights can be drawn from the analysis. First, the Maldivian experience highlights 
that institutional frameworks were built through the concerted efforts of social actors. This 
suggests that understanding the relationship between social actors and institutions is required to 
understand institutional change. Second, improvement in employment conditions in the Maldives 
resulted from institutional rather than economic change, suggesting that at least some political 
transformation is needed if employment rights are to be improved. Third, the change of the 
progressive government in 2012 and reversal of democracy and IR gains back to the old order of 
1968 to 2008 suggest that just as in Latin America, there is no guarantee that civil, political and 
labour rights have been irrevocably secured (Anner, 2008; Bronstein, 1995). Future research 
should examine the changes in a longer time frame to determine whether they have indeed 
delivered a more equal power balance between labour and capital.   
The critical incident approach used here has proved useful for defining a time-span of critical 
events and evaluating their significance. It could also help determine whether the February 2012 
coup, the subsequent presidential elections, or some other event presents the kind of watershed in 
Maldivian politics and IR that the death of an inmate of the Maafushi island prison proved to be. 
Future research could also investigate which new international standards and practices sourced 
from the outside-in through normative means have been embedded in Maldivian institutions and 
systems. This will help determine whether and how political and economic logics in the 
Maldives have changed, and how its fledgling IR system is likely to develop. 
Finally, while the present research identified specific political and economic factors influencing 
change in one country, the Maldives, future research should employ a comparative focus to 
illuminate whether similar patterns exist in other countries (Björkman et al., 2007). It is an 
intriguing question why it is so much easier to oust progressive governments in some countries 
than others, and how unions and other popular movements are prevented from limiting such 
change. Democratic change in the Maldives and its reversal have parallels with the events of the 
Arab Springs (Köhler & Bonnerjee, 2012). Accordingly, the concepts and research approach of 
this paper could be helpful in analysing political and IR change in the Arab world. 
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